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INTERNATIONAL COMITY AND THE NONSTATE ACTOR, MICROSOFT: WHY LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO DATA STORED
ABROAD ACT (LEADS ACT) PROMOTES
INTERNATIONAL COMITY
Sabah Siddiqui+‡

Over a third of the population in the United States has sent or read an email
in the last twenty-four hours.1 The email may have been well wishes from your
+
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On April 17, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the case that is the
subject of this paper, Microsoft v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter
Microsoft II], will be dismissed due to mootness caused by the passage of the Clarifying
Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (“CLOUD Act”).The Law Enforcement Access to Data
Stored Abroad Act (“LEADS Act”), discussed infra, and the CLOUD Act are quite different
in nature. The LEADS Act, if it were passed, would have simply provided clarification that
warrants under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) would only apply to U.S. Citizens
and not EU citizens. The LEADS Act would address the current conflicts issue more
effectively than the CLOUD Act. The Author argues that the passage of the LEADS Act
should be renewed in the interest of international comity. However, the CLOUD Act,
enacted and signed into law on March 23, 2018, enables law enforcement to bypass the
process proscribed in Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”) which would hinder
international comity even more. This article argues for the U.S. to go through the MLATs
process and if anything, countries should consider re-negotiating the MLATs to make them
more amenable to each country’s law enforcement needs. Because this paper is purely a
conflicts of law analysis discussing the proper, extraterritorial application of the SCA, the
Author solely focuses on the LEADS Act and does not discuss the CLOUD Act.
1

Frank Newport, The New Era of Communication Among Americans, GALLUP (Nov.
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childhood friend, a confirmation of your wife’s birthday present, an email from
your boss asking for the status of a memorandum, or pertinent details related to
a drug trafficking scheme. In the latter instance, a judge may issue United States
law enforcement a probable cause warrant2 under 18 U.S.C. 2703 for the content
of these emails and a federal or state agent would serve this warrant on an email
provider located in the United States.3 However, the email service provider may
have made the business decision— independent of the criminal or civil action
investigation—to store the emails outside the United States.4 Currently, as a
result, email providers are refusing to turn over emails stored abroad, even if the
U.S. governmental entity deems the emails necessary to the investigation.5
Except in national security-related criminal charges and investigations and in
cases involving child pornography, email service providers can refuse to comply
with a warrant requesting emails stored in their data centers located outside the

10, 2014), http://news.gallup.com/poll/179288/new-era-communication-americans.aspx.
2
Erica L. Danielsen, Cell Phone Searches After Riley: Establishing Probable Cause
and Applying Search Warrant Exceptions, 36 PACE L. REV. 970, 976–77 (2016)
(demonstrating that Magistrate judges may only issue search warrants based on probable
cause). Some courts apply either the stringent two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test, which
provides that probable cause exists if the application for the warrant describes the
“underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the
validity of the informant’s conclusion” and there must be enough information for the judge
to determine the validity and reliability of the informant. Id. at 977. On the other hand, some
courts apply a less stringent test than the Aguilar-Spinelli, which applies a “totality-of-thecircumstances” approach. Id.
3
Microsoft v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 207 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct.
356 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-2) [hereinafter Microsoft IV]; see 18 U.S.C. § 2703
(2016); Peter J. Henning, Microsoft Case Shows the Limits of Data Privacy Law, N.Y.
TIMES (July 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/business/dealbook/microsoftcase-shows-the-limits-of-a-data-privacy-law.html (“With a few keystrokes, electronic files
can be whisked across the globe . . . While the files were in Ireland, that was more a product
of how the company chose to store them rather than a conscious decision by the account
owner to try to keep them outside the United States.”).
4
Mark Scott, Ireland Lends Support to Microsoft in Email Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 24, 2015), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/ireland-lends-support-tomicrosoft-in-email-privacy-case/ (recognizing that, “[l]ike other American companies,
Microsoft uses data centers around the world for cloud computing services like email and
data storage.”).
5
See Case Comment, Privacy Law—Stored Communications Act—District Court
Holds that SCA Warrant Obligates U.S. Provider to Produce Emails Stored on Foreign
Servers.—In re Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1019, 1025 n.51
(2015) (describing Microsoft’s refusal to comply with a search warrant served by the U.S.
government); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell
Delivers Remarks Highlighting Cybercrime Enforcement at Center for Strategic and
International Studies (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-highlighting-cybercrime.
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United States.6 This may have a detrimental effect on governmental
investigations, especially if the service provider can easily access the
information from the United States but it can also assist in maintaining
international comity.7 The issue presented in the upcoming Supreme Court case,
Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), is whether an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) must comply with a warrant under the Stored Communications
Act when the information under the ISPs’ control is outside the United States.8
Based on case law regarding extraterritorial application of federal statutes, the
Supreme Court should rule in favor of the Government and reverse the appellate
court decision.9 In addition, Congress should amend the Secured
Communications Act (SCA) to address the conflicts of law issues that arose
because of advances in technology since SCA’s enactment.10
Part I of this Article discusses the statutory background information regarding
the issues presented in Microsoft v. United States.11 Part II reviews the common
law and procedural information related to the Microsoft cases and the potential

6
See Microsoft v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter
Microsoft II] (explaining that Microsoft provided the customer’s non-content information to
the government but refrained from providing content information that was stored in Ireland);
Brian G. Slocum, Virtual Child Pornography: Does It Mean the End of the Child
Pornography Exception to the First Amendment, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 639 (2004)
(highlighting the compelling governmental interest in protecting children by prohibiting
child pornography); see also Lindsay La Marca, I Got 99 Problems and a Warrant Is One:
How Current Interpretations of the Stored Communications Act Offend International
Comity, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 972 (2016) (stating that in addition to a company refusing
to comply with a warrant, a country may not be obligated to provide the requested
information if the information is held outside the U.S. and there is no Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty).
7
La Marca, supra note 6, at 971–72 (illustrating that Internet Service Providers
(“ISPs”) are beginning to store electronic information in “server farms” or “data centers”
outside the U.S.); see Henning, supra note 3.
8
See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2016) (stating that a violation of the Stored
Communications Act occurs when an entity has access to information stored with an
electronic communication service and prevents authorized access to this electronic
communication); Microsoft IV, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 356
(U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-2).
9
See Melissa Medina, The Stored Communications Act: An Old Statute for Modern
Times, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 269–70 (2013) (stating the rationale for the varying court
interpretations of the SCA is due to the differences in technology throughout the years);
Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the
Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 88 (2006) (highlighting that there is a
presumption against extraterritoriality that guides courts that are engaging in statutory
interpretation).
10 See Medina, supra note 9, at 289 (“[A]ttempting to fit modern technology into the
limited technological framework of 1986 has proven to be a daunting task.”).
11 See infra Part I.
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circuit split that may occur.12 Next, Part III argues the Supreme Court should
narrowly hold that a company providing email services in the United States must
comply with a warrant issued under 18 U.S.C. 2703 when the user is a United
States citizen, even if such data is stored outside the United States.13 Finally, this
Article argues in Part IV that the Supreme Court’s decision would not resolve
the issues presented, and there is a need for Congress to amend the SCA given
the advancements in technology since its enactment and possible resolutions.14
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects the, “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”15 It limits law enforcement from encroaching on constitutionally
protected areas, including documents, by requiring a valid warrant to be issued
based on probable cause with very few exceptions.16 Correspondence via emails
12
13
14
15

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
The Fourth Amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16 Ilana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act
Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 617, 624 (2011); see Dana T. Benedetti, How Far Can the Government’s Hand
Reach Inside Your Personal Inbox?: Problems with the SCA, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH.
& PRIVACY L. 75, 76–77 (2013) (discussing the test for determining what is a
constitutionally protected area and comparing emails to other forms of communication and
highlighting that “this test has helped courts conclude that certain mediums of traditional
communication, including telephone conversations and postal letters, are constitutionally
protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy.”); see also Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (holding that a valid warrant must be issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate judge and that even the slightest deviation from the search warrant violates the
Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.”); Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 212 (2d Cir.
2016) (“Warrants issued in accordance with the Fourth Amendment thus identify discrete
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can be viewed as analogous to physical documents.17 However, when an
individual sends an email from his or her home computer, neither the email nor
its data is fully protected in the same manner as homes are under the Fourth
Amendment.18 If law enforcement seeks to enter an individual’s home to search
for a document that law enforcement reasonably suspects to be in a certain
location in the home, then he or she must have a search warrant specifying the
document and the location where they may reasonably find it.19 However, the
data embedded in emails does not receive the same protection.20 Courts render
non-content information, such as account information and IP addresses
associated with emails stored by ISPs, outside the scope of protection under the
Fourth Amendment because courts recognize individuals have voluntarily given
this information to third parties thereby relinquishing a reasonable expectation
of privacy.21
B. The Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act (SCA), enacted in 1986, is Title II of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.22 The SCA fills in the gaps of the
Fourth Amendment to provide more robust privacy protection that the Fourth

objects and places, and restrict the government’s ability to act beyond the warrant’s purview
. . . outside of the place identified, which must be described in the document.”).
17 See In re Search of the Information Associated with [Redacted]@mac.com that is
Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 157, 165 (D.D.C. 2014)
(illuminating that the search of electronic storage media is not limited to the place where
law enforcement executes the search warrant because law enforcement can take the
electronic storage media from the place where the warrant is executed and then later search
for the stored information that falls within the scope of the warrant).
18 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 547, 626 (2017) (explaining that the differences between the protection of the home
and an email are the constitutional interests that the courts want to protect).
19 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (asserting that the zone of privacy
is nowhere “more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific
constitutional terms.”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (stressing the
importance of the particularity requirement); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
39 (2001) (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire
area is held safe from prying government eyes.”).
20 See United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a
plaintiff does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in its IP address as it is metadata
under the Fourth Amendment).
21 Chris Conley, Non-Content Is Not Non-Sensitive: Moving Beyond the Content/NonContent Distinction, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821, 822–25 (2014); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s
Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004).
22 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2016); Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Amendment does not expressly provide.23 Congress enacted the SCA to protect
a user’s private information, including content24 and non-content information25
by imposing regulations primarily on electronic communication service
providers26 and remote computing service providers.27 The SCA also places
limitations on when the government may compel an ISP to disclose stored
content and non-content information.28 More specifically, the SCA protects
information in electronic storage such as email and social media messages.29 The
SCA defines “electronic storage” as the “temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication . . . and any storage of such communication .
. . for purposes of backup protection.”30 Congress enacted the SCA to bolster
privacy rights in the user’s data held by service providers, protect users from
impermissible disclosure by service providers, and set boundaries for the

23 Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 350–51 (2009);
see also S. Rep. No. 90-541, at 5 (1986) (discussing how the “law must advance with the
technology” when the Department of Justice recommended amendments to ECPA).
24 William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the
Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1207 (2010). Content information includes
the substantive information of the email, including the subject line, any components of the
message in the email, and attachments. Laura J. Tyson, A Break in the Internet Privacy
Chain: How Law Enforcement Connects Content to Non-Content to Discover an Internet
User’s Identity, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1257, 1265 (2010).
25 Daniel Shickich, What Your Tweet Doesn’t Say: Twitter, Non-Content Data, and the
Stored Communications Act, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 457, 459 (2013). Non-content
information of an email includes sender and recipient email addresses, time when email was
sent and IP addresses. In re § 2703(d), 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435 (E.D. Va. 2011); In re
Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.,
15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft I].
26 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). Electronic communication service is defined as “any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2016).
27 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2016). The SCA defines remote computing service as
“provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2016).
28 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2016). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (defining “electronic
communication service providers” as a service which provides to users thereof the ability to
send or receive wire or electronic communications); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (defining “remote
computing service providers” as entity providing computer storage or processing services by
means of an electronic communications system to the public).
29 Stored Wire and Electronic Communications (Title II of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act—The Stored Communications Act), 4 E-COMMERCE AND
INTERNET LAW 44.07 (Dec. 2017).
30 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2016); Electronic storage is not the information an individual
stores or backs up on his or her hard drive, but rather the information a service provider
holds in its capacity as providing services to its users. Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications (Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act—The Stored
Communications Act), supra note 29.
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government when it seeks to compel disclosure of a user’s account information
from service providers.31 Together, these statutory privacy rights allow account
holders protections similar to those in the Fourth Amendment.32
The SCA restricts disclosure by ISPs to third parties with certain limited
exceptions set forth in Section 2702 of the SCA (“Section 2702”) including,
“consent of the originator [sender of the e-mail] or upon notice to the intended
recipient, or pursuant to § 2703.”33 Together, Sections 2702 and 2703 are
arguably the “heart of the SCA.”34 These provisions permits a governmental
entity to compel a service provider to disclose its customers’ communications
and records subject to a valid warrant, administrative subpoena, grand jury or
trial subpoena, or court order.35
When required, warrants issued under the SCA by a federal court of
competent jurisdiction must be based on probable cause and in compliance with
standards set forth in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or
applicable criminal procedures of states with jurisdiction over the matter.36 Law
enforcement must obtain a warrant for the information an electronic
communication service provider stores for 180 days or less under Section
2703(a).37 If either an electronic communication service provider or a remote
computing service provider stores the information for more than 180 days, then
the governmental entity does not need a warrant so long as it provides prior
notice to the customer.38

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND THE

31 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2703 (2016) (creating causes of action for intentional
unauthorized access to, or dissemination of, electronic communications); see Kerr, supra
note 21, at 1213 (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 2702 places limits on situations in which ISPs can
voluntarily disclose data to the government).
32 Scolnik, supra note 23, at 372.
33 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 207 (2d Cir. 2016).
34 Kerr, supra note 22, at 1218.
35 Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
36 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(5)(A)–(C) (governing the procedural rules for law
enforcement to be able to search and seize electronic data requiring probable cause by a
magistrate judge in federal court); In re Search of Information Associated with
[Redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj757 (GMH), 2017 WL 2480752, at *2 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); Claudia Catalano, Annotation,
Unlawful Access Under Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 et seq., 1 A.L.R.
Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2015).
37 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 232.
38 Id.; see United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that
failure for the government to provide notice to the account holder is not a violation of the
SCA if the government obtains a nondisclosure court order and will not result in an
exclusion of evidence).
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CURRENT STATE OF COMMON LAW
A. Microsoft I: Magistrate Judge Holding and District Court Holding
Pursuant to a narcotics investigation, the Government served Microsoft
Corporation with a warrant under the authority of Section 2703 for content and
non-content information associated with a Hotmail account that Microsoft
stored.39 Microsoft moved to quash the warrant on the grounds that it stored
some of the requested information, specifically the content information, in
Dublin, Ireland.40 Microsoft argued that the Government’s demand for the
content-based information stored outside the United States is an impermissible
search and seizure under the SCA.41
Microsoft based its decision to store such information in Ireland on business
grounds and not as a means to hinder law enforcement in connection with their
investigation.42 Microsoft has data centers43 throughout the United States that
stores the content and non-content information associated with each email
account.44 These data centers store the content through a process known as
“network latency.”45 Network latency is an automatic process that enables
Microsoft to provide efficient service to its customers by storing content at the
closest data center.46 The “country code” determines the closest data center of
the account holder when the user registered his or her account.47 At the end of
this process, data centers store all content information outside the United States
based on the “country code” of the account holder and some non-content
information in the United States.48

39 See Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 467–68 (providing that Microsoft is a United
States-based corporation headquartered in Redmond, Washington).
40 Id. at 468.
41 Id. at 470.
42 Brief for Appellant at 58, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985).
43 Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 467. “A data center is a [physical] repository [where
data is stored] that houses computing facilities like servers, routers, switches and firewalls,
as well as supporting components like backup equipment, fire suppression facilities and air
conditioning.” Data Center, TECHNOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/349/data-center (last visited May 24, 2018).
44 Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 467.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. A country code is an identification assigned to an email account upon registration.
Based on how the end user answers where they are located, Microsoft will assign the
country code associated with that country, which determines the appropriate data center.
Joint Appendix at 30, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (No. 17-2),
2017 WL 6206253.
48 Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 467.
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The magistrate judge addressed whether under the SCA, the Government
could compel Microsoft to disclose information even if it stores the information
in a foreign country.49 Examining congressional intent and the structure of the
SCA, the judge determined the language regarding compliance with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure in Section 2703 to be ambiguous.50 The ambiguity
was whether the judge should incorporate all of Rule 41 or only the procedural
requirements.51 Based on the unique statutory structure of the SCA, the judge
determined that warrants issued under the SCA do not act like traditional
warrants and resemble a warrant-subpoena hybrid structure.52 Here, the
Government was not entering the premises of the data center owned by
Microsoft or searching Microsoft’s servers for the requested information.53
Rather, the Government was compelling Microsoft to provide the requested
information under its control.54
Further, the judge found the warrant did not raise issues regarding the
presumption against extraterritorial application of a statute.55 The Court held the
warrant issued on Microsoft “[did] not criminalize conduct taking place in a
foreign country; it [did] not involve the deployment of American law
enforcement personnel abroad; [and] it [did] not require even the physical
presence of service provider employees at the location where data are stored.”56
It reasoned that the content and non-content information, despite being stored
abroad, was at all times under the control of Microsoft in the U.S. and therefore
did not induce extraterritorial application issues.57 The magistrate judge denied

49 Id. The magistrate judge highlighted the extraterritorial application of the SCA by
stating, “[t]he rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries throws
the law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena that need to become the subject of
clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially based
sovereign.” Id.
50 Id. at 470. Initially, the magistrate judge analyzed the plain statutory language and
upon finding Section 2703(a) to be ambiguous whether only procedural rules of 41(a)
applied and substantive rules would be encompassed from other sources or whether all of
Rule 41 was incorporated by reference. Id.
51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)–(i); Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470.
52 Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72. See generally Paul K. Ohm, Parallel-Effect
Statutes and E-Mail Warrants: Reframing the Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1599, 1610–11 (2004) (explaining the hybrid nature between warrants and
subpoenas); Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the Fog of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression
Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 815–16 (2002)
(explaining that the SCA places restrictions on access to communications and what an ISP
can disclose, which is unique to the Fourth Amendment).
53 Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471–72.
54 Id. at 476.
55 Id. at 475, 477.
56 Id. at 475.
57 Id. at 477.
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Microsoft’s motion to quash the warrant.58 The District Court affirmed the
magistrate judge’s findings and further held Microsoft in contempt for refusing
to comply with the warrant.59
B. The Morrison Standard and its Application on Microsoft II
1. Morrison Standard on Extraterritorial Application of Federal Law
The standard for determining extraterritorial application of a federal statute
was set forth in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).60
Here, the Supreme Court sought to determine whether Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) permitted a foreign plaintiff
to file a claim against the United States and foreign defendants for securities
traded on a foreign stock exchange.61 The Supreme Court held that Section
10(b) did not apply extraterritorially.62 Additionally, it recognized that “the
focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated,
but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”63 Justice Scalia
wrote the opinion establishing the Morrison test and asserted that “[i]t is a
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.’”64 In other words, there is a presumption against
extraterritorial application of a federal statute.65
In the holding of Morrison, the Supreme Court created the proper test for
determining extraterritorial application of a statute because prior to this case,
there were differentiating tests to which the Circuit and District Courts adhered
to, which created impracticable and unpredictable results.66 The first prong of
Id.
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., No. 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014).
Tactically, the contempt order allowed Microsoft to appeal without addressing potential
jurisdictional issues. Alex Wilhelm, Microsoft Held In Contempt As It Battles A Domestic
Search, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 10, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/09/10/microsoft-heldin-contempt-as-it-battles-a-domestic-search-warrant-demanding-overseas-data/.
60 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 251 (2010).
61 Id. at 253 n.2 (citation omitted).
62 Id. at 265.
63 Id. at 266.
64 Id. at 255 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 257; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding the conduct and effect test where jurisdiction only exists if substantial acts that
furthered the fraud occurred in the United States), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
58
59
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the Morrison test is whether the statute expressly permits extraterritorial
application.67 If the statute does not expressly permit extraterritorial application,
then the second prong is to determine the focus of the statute and whether the
facts in the case suggest that “the challenged application [will result in an]
‘extraterritorial’ [application of the law] and [is] therefore outside the statutory
bounds.”68
2. The Application of the Morrison Test in Microsoft II
On appeal, the Second Circuit focused on whether the SCA permits
enforcement of warrants outside the United States.69 The Second Circuit used
the Morrison two-part test to determine whether a federal statute is intended to
apply extraterritorially.70 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the District
Court’s holding in favor of the Government, directing the District Court to quash
the part of the warrant compelling disclosure for data stored outside the United
States and vacated the District Court’s finding of contempt.71
Using the Morrison test, the Second Circuit found the SCA does not provide
for extraterritorial application in Section 2703.72 Consequently, the SCA failed
the first prong of the test.73 In determining the focus of the statute, the Court
analyzed the warrant provision of the SCA.74 The Court examined the SCA as a
whole, the intended contacts of the statute and the legislative history of the
SCA.75 The Court determined the focus of the SCA is to provide user privacy
for stored communication as defined in the SCA.76
The Court then applied the facts at hand to determine whether such
application would result in an impermissible extraterritorial application of the
law.77 Here, the Court noted the citizenship of the individual whose account
67 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255; Regulatory Developments 2012, 68 BUS. LAW. 843, 971
(2012) (showing that Morrison is upheld in higher Circuit Courts).
68 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016).
69 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 214–15. Microsoft appealed the District Court’s holding,
requesting de novo review of the extraterritorial application of the warrant on the grounds
that the finding of contempt of court was an “abuse of discretion standard that is more
rigorous than usual.” Brief for Appellant at 18, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 13-MJ-2814 (2014) (No. 142985-cv).
70 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 210.
71 Id. at 222.
72 Id. at 210.
73 See id. (disposing of analysis of the Morrison test first prong due to Government
concession and noting the intended contacts were domestic in nature).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 211–12.
76 Id. at 219.
77 Id. at 220.
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information the Government sought was not on record—i.e. whether the warrant
law enforcement served Microsoft with was for an account holder, who is a
citizen of the United States or is a citizen of a foreign country residing outside
the United States.78
Since the focus of the SCA is user privacy, the Circuit Court found the
magistrate judge failed to adequately acknowledge that the user’s data at interest
is located at a data center in a foreign country. Thus, the Circuit Court found the
warrant did not pass the Morrison test and that enforcement of the warrant would
result in an impermissible extraterritorial application of the SCA.79 The Second
Circuit denied the Government’s petition to re-hear the claim en banc and
subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court to hear
this claim.80 The Supreme Court granted the petition on October 16, 2017.81
C. Potential Circuit Split and District Court Reactions to the Microsoft Cases
The Supreme Court’s holding may resolve the impending circuit split over
the issue of extraterritorial application of Section 2703.82 In the case, In re:
Information associated with one Yahoo email address that is stored at premises
controlled by Yahoo; In re: Two email accounts stored at Google, Inc., 2017
WL 706307 ((E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017), the court declined to follow the Second
Circuit’s holding in Microsoft II.83 Just as Microsoft’s case, Google and Yahoo
stored some of their information in servers outside of the United States on their
own accord.84 The court declined to follow the Second Circuit’s decision in
Microsoft II and provided that the Second Circuit misapplied the Morrison
analysis.85 Instead, this court determined the focus of Section 2703 of the SCA
is the service provider’s obligation to comply with a properly issued warrant and
is not user privacy.86 The District Court ruled in favor of the Government.87
The District of Columbia District also declined to follow the Second Circuit’s

Id. at 220–21.
Id.
80 Microsoft v. United States, 855 F.3d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Microsoft III].
81 Microsoft IV, 138 S. Ct. 356, 356 (2017).
82 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2016).
83 This is a consolidated case arising out of the warrants issued to Google and Yahoo
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, which compels the disclosure of information as it relates to certain
bank accounts. In re Information Associated with One Yahoo Email Address that is Stored
at Premises Controlled by Yahoo, No. 17-M-1234, 2017 WL 706307, at *1, *3 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 21, 2017).
84 Id. at *1.
85 Id. at *2.
86 Id. at *3.
87 Id. at *1.
78
79
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holding In The Matter Of The Search of Information Associated with [Redacted]
@Gmail.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc.88 The
magistrate Judge for the D.C. District Court stated the Second Circuit in
Microsoft II erred because Google has the ability to access the data stored abroad
easily and instantly from the United States.89 And in this regard, when a judge
issues a warrant under the authority of the SCA, thereby compelling a United
States-based service provider to disclose certain stored communication, even if
the data is stored outside the country, the disclosure would not amount to
extraterritorial application of the law.90 Unlike the Microsoft Court, the D.C.
District Court held that the focus of Section 2703 is not user privacy but is
disclosure, which constitutes domestic conduct.91
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Supreme Court Should Grant the Government’s Writ and Should rule
in favor of the Government
Under current precedent established by the Supreme Court, requiring a
service provider based in the United States to access data stored within the
United States is not an impermissible extraterritorially application of Section
2703 of the SCA.92 To determine whether the application of a law may apply
outside the United States, courts turn to a principle of statutory construction that
begins with the presumption against extraterritorial application, then resolve this
presumption using the two-step process the court established in Morrison.93 This
presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.”94 While it is within Congress’s powers to enact laws to
apply in foreign jurisdictions, determining whether Congress has intended such
laws to apply extraterritorially is matter of deduction by the courts.95 The courts
may determine Congressional intent either by looking to the express language
88 In re Search of Information Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757 (GMH), 2017 WL 2480752, at *1, *2
(D.D.C. June 2, 2017).
89 Id. at *6.
90 Id. at *10.
91 Id. at *7, *10.
92 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
93 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2099 (2016).
94 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569, U.S. 108, 115 (2013) (quoting EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
95 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246
(1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1074.
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of the statute, the entire related Act or Title as a whole, or whether Congress
intended a certain provision to apply outside the confines of the United States.96
First, the Supreme Court will look to the express language and legislative
history of the statute to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. At this
step in the analysis, the question is whether the statute itself authorizes
application of the law outside the United States.97 Unless Congress has indicated
an intent for foreign application of the law, the presumption is that Congress has
legislated over domestic conduct.98 The Supreme Court has also found
permissive extraterritorial application in a statute in which foreign conduct is
incidental to the prohibited conduct.99
In Pfizer v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 306 (1978) the Supreme Court
found Congress intended Section 4 of the Clayton Act to include claims brought
by foreign nations by examining the legislative purpose of the Act.100
Distinguishable from Microsoft II, the issue in Pfizer was whether foreign
nations could file a claim for violations of the Sherman Act, and thus maintain
the same protections as a domestic corporation or person.101 The Supreme Court
answered in the affirmative, thus effectively allowing applications of the antitrust protections to apply outside the jurisdiction of the United States.102
The Second Circuit found Section 2703 does not expressly authorize
extraterritorial application.103 An examination of the SCA provides that one of
Congress’ purposes for enacting the SCA was to provide Fourth Amendmentlike protections to secured communications by placing obligations on service
providers conducting business within the United States from improperly
disclosing an individual’s data to third parties.104 The SCA does not purport to
authorize enforcement of any of its provisions outside the United States whether
by express language or legislative history.105 The 1986 House Judiciary
Committee Report noted the SCA is “intended to apply only to access in the

96 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 265, superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; see Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 288
(1949) (stating that Congress would not have intended for such an application).
97 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
98 Id. at 2100.
99 See id. at 2096 (defining “racketeering” to include criminal conduct that impliedly
may occur abroad such as the assassination of government agents).
100 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2016); Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 306, 311–12 (1978)
(stating that Section 4 of the Clayton Act allowed for any person to file a claim injured by
an antitrust violation in a US District Court having jurisdiction over the defendant).
101 Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 310–11.
102 Id. at 320.
103 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016).
104 Medina, supra note 9, at 276.
105 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 219.
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territorial United States.”106
The second prong of the Morrison test involves determining the focus of the
statute.107 Therefore, the Supreme Court must determine if compelling Microsoft
to fully comply with the SCA warrant—even though the content information is
located in Ireland—would be an impermissible application of the warrant
provision of the SCA.108 The Court will examine “the ‘territorial event[s]’ or
‘relationship[s]’ that are the ‘focus’” of Section 2703.109 If the facts before the
court establish sufficient domestic contact, then the presumption against
impermissible extraterritorial application will apply and the claim will
proceed.110 In a recent case regarding the application of the Morrison test, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that at this stage of the analysis, “[the] inquiry
into whether the domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid triggering the
presumption [against extraterritorial application].”111
At the time the Second Circuit decided Microsoft II, the Second Circuit was
the highest court to consider the issue in Microsoft II.112 However, since then,
every other court that has faced the same issue has rejected the Second Circuit’s
holding.113 Notably, the Second Circuit is the only court that has found the focus
of Section 2703 to be user privacy.114 The source of discontent among courts is
the statutory interpretation of the SCA when determining its focus.115
The focus of Section 2703 is the requirement for a service provider based in
the United States to comply with a probable cause warrant when the conduct is

106 Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 362 (2015)
(emphasis added).
107 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 210.
108 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 221.
109 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank LTD., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010)).
110 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 127 (2013).
111 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 216.
112 In re Search of Information Associated with Accounts Identified as
[Redacted]@gmail.com and Others Identified in Attachment A that are Stored at Premises
Controlled by Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountain View, CA94025, No.
16-mc-80263-RS, 2017 WL 3478809, at *1, *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017).
113 In re Search of Information Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored at
Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16–mj–757 (GMH), 2017 WL 2480752, at *1, *6
(D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re Search of Content that is Stored at Premises Controlled by
Google, No. 16-mc-80263-LB, 2017 WL 1487625, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017); In
re Information Associated with One Yahoo Email Address that is Stored at Premises
Controlled by Yahoo, Case No. 17-M-1234, 2017 WL 706307, at *1, *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21,
2017).
114 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 219.
115 In re Search of Information Associated with Accounts Identified as
[Redacted]@gmail.com and Others Identified in Attachment A that are Stored at Premises
Controlled by Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94025, No.
16-mc-80263-RS, 2017 WL 3478809, at *1, *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017).
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domestic conduct.116 Therefore, the location of Microsoft’s data centers is
irrelevant with regard to the focus of the statute.117 Accordingly, the Second
Circuit was too broad in its review of the focus of the warrant provision of the
SCA.118 When analyzing whether a statute may apply outside the United States,
the Supreme Court must concentrate its attention on “the statute provision-byprovision, not as a whole.”119 While Congress enacted the SCA to afford
electronic and stored communication protection similar to the Fourth
Amendment, it carves out exceptions in the event an electronic service provider
is required to disclose information under their control to a government entity.120
To emphasize the plain language of the statute, the Government states, the
purpose of Section 2703 is to regulate disclosure of private information to the
government.121 This shows that while the SCA as a whole seeks to regulate user
privacy by placing obligations on a service provider to prevent unauthorized
disclosure to any such third parties, it has expressly allowed law enforcement to
compel disclosure of information when the service provider is served with a
valid warrant.122 In accordance with the Morrison test, the focus of the Section
2703 is the location of the service provider, who is served with the warrant, not
the location of the data center.123
If the conduct related to the focus of the statute occurs in the United States
rather than abroad, then the application of the statute would be permissible under
the Morrison test.124 Therefore, if the focus of the warrant provision of the SCA
is the disclosure by the service provider, the location of the service provider and
its personnel and the retrieval of the data are all within the United States, which
is closer in relation to the focus of the statute.125 Even though some factors may
touch beyond the borders of the United States, such as the location of

Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 201(emphasis added).
Id. at 220.
118 Id. at 217.
119 Microsoft III, 855 F.3d 53, 75 (2d Cir. 2017) (Droney, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (providing that if a provision reaches
application abroad, the extraterritorial application will be limited to that one provision and
not the whole statute).
120 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 217.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 219 (stating that the main reason Congress enacted the SCA was to protect
disclosure of content by third-parties and that the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment would protect consumers from improper governmental access).
123 Id. at 201.
124 In re Search of Information Associated with Accounts Identified as
[Redacted]@gmail.com and Others Identified in Attachment A that are Stored at Premises
Controlled by Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94025, No.
16-mc-80263-RS, 2017 WL 3478809, at *1, *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017).
125 Id.
116
117
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Microsoft’s data centers, this factor in particular is not the focus of Section
2703.126
After determining the focus of the statute, the facts of the case will be applied
to ascertain whether the “challenged application” would result in impermissible
extraterritorial application.127 Requiring Microsoft to comply with the
Government’s valid warrant would not be an impermissible extraterritorial
application of Section 2703.128 Judge Dennis Jacobs, a Second Circuit judge,
noted in his dissent against the denial of the government’s rehearing en banc that
the warrant would not result in unlawful extraterritorial application because the
information requested in the warrant related to a Microsoft account holder is
“served on Microsoft” and because “[the corporation] has access to the
information sought. It need only touch some keys in Redmond, Washington.”129
The act of disclosure is domestic conduct to which Microsoft has access and
over which it has control.130 The location of the data center, whether in the
United States or in Ireland, is irrelevant.131
B. User Privacy as it Relates to the Fourth Amendment
The central Fourth Amendment implication in the Microsoft case is whether
compliance with the warrant issued to Microsoft, under the authority of the SCA,
would be a violation of Fourth Amendment protections of its users.132 Notably,
the dissenting opinion denying the Government’s rehearing en banc articulated
that ruling in favor of Microsoft is by no means a victory in protecting user
privacy.133 Following the District Court’s decision that ruled in favor of the
United States, Microsoft’s General Counsel, Brad Smith, claimed that the United
States is attempting to “sidestep” the Fourth Amendment.134 Interestingly, it is
Microsoft’s argument that “sidesteps” the fact that it, alongside other service
providers in the United States, such as Google and Yahoo, automatically store

Id. at *3.
Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016).
128 See id. (reiterating the presumption that congressional legislation only applies to
territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
129 Microsoft III, 855 F.3d 53, 61 (2d Cir. 2017).
130 See Jara v. Nunez, 878 F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2018) (providing that an act will be
consider domestic if a sufficient amount of relevant contacts is in the United States);
Microsoft III, 855 F.3d at 61.
131 Microsoft III, 855 F.3d at 61.
132 Id. at 56.
133 Id. at 61.
134 Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Microsoft Paves the Way for Data Privacy,
N.Y. L. J. (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202672465322/?slreturn=2018000612545
2.
126
127
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emails and other data outside the United States as a business decision to improve
the productivity of their systems.135 Thus, the primary motivation of service
providers is not to store their data for purposes of stringent user privacy
protection.136
It is significant to note that Congress enacted the SCA to obligate service
providers to protect customers’ and subscribers’ privacy from the government
and other third parties.137 Section 2703 of the SCA is an important focal point
when examining the Fourth Amendment-like protections granted to a user’s
stored communications.138 Section 2703 “sets up a pyramidal structure
governing conditions under which service providers must disclose stored
communications to the government.”139 Each ascending tier of the pyramid
delineates an increasingly thorough legal process that the government must
accomplish before compelling disclosure.140 The two factors that influence
compelling disclosure include (1) whether the data is content or non-content
information and (2) whether the issuer provided the user with notice.141
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld that citizens can reasonably expect
less privacy in stored communication, such as emails, because the user relays
stored communications to third parties as in line with the reasoning to which the
court adhered in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).142 When a judge
135 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2016). Google has seven data servers located
outside of the United States in Chile, Taiwan, Singapore, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, and
Belgium, that provide infrastructure support to their
operations. Data Center Locations, GOOGLE DATA CENTERS, https://www.google.com/about
/datacenters/inside/locations/index.html (last visited May 24, 2018); Charlie Savage, Claire
Cain Miller & Nicole Perlroth., N.S.A. Said to Tap Google and Yahoo Abroad, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2013, at B1.
136 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 224; see How Email Works, RUNBOX,
https://runbox.com/email-school/how-email-works/ (last visited May 24, 2018) (describing
that in exchange for providing free email services, large email service providers such as
Google sell a user’s information to certain advertisers based on the content of that user’s
emails).
137 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 217; see also Court Seems Unconvinced Of Microsoft’s
Argument To Shield Email Data Stored Overseas, NPR (Feb. 27, 2018 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/584650612/new-front-in-data-privacy-at-the-supremecourt-can-u-s-seize-emails-stored-abroad (noting that the Fourth Amendment does not
expressly provide protection in data stored by a third party and protection on such data has
been by convention of common law and the SCA).
138 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 207; see Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying the Stored
Communications Act to the Civil Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1259, 1261–62 (2012) (stating that the SCA provides “Fourth Amendment plus”
protection to communication stored by a statutorily defined service provider).
139 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 207.
140 Id.
141 Id.; Kattan, supra note 16, at 629–30.
142 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (finding that a person has no
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issues a warrant under the SCA based on probable cause and in accordance with
applicable Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the warrant is presumptively
constitutionally valid and has provided the necessary deference by law
enforcement to respect the individual’s privacy.143 Regarding the warrant served
on Microsoft, the dissenting judges in the denial of a rehearing en banc reiterated
that “the government complied with the most restrictive privacy-protecting
requirements of the [SCA]. Those requirements are consistent with the highest
levels of protection ordinarily required by the fourth Amendment for the
issuance of search warrants.”144 It is integral to consider that the underlying
reason that prompted the SCA’s enactment was the courts grappling with how
they should treat electronic communications under the Fourth Amendment.145
C. Conflicts of Law Analysis and the Implications of Ruling in Favor of
Microsoft as it Relates to International Comity
Given the nature of data transfers, Microsoft v. United States is a cross-border
case implicating the laws of the United States, EU, Ireland the state where the
account holder is located.146 To understand the ramifications of a decision,
which rules in favor of Microsoft, a review of Brainerd Currie’s “interest
analysis” for conflicts of law issues, otherwise known as “governmental interest
analysis,” is appropriate to determine whether there is in fact a conflict and
whose law should apply.147 The first step is to determine each jurisdiction’s

expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third party); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (finding that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, so
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742
(1979) (holding that use of a pen register to record phone numbers does not constitute a
search when the information has been disclosed to a third party because there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy).
143 Kerr, supra note 21, at 1209 (2004).
144 Microsoft III, 855 F.3d 53, 63 n.5 (2d Cir. 2017) (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (quoting
Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 223 (2d Cir. 2016)) (Lynch, J., concurring).
145 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d at 219.
146 Id. at 230.
147 See Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Chappell, 407 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding if a case presents a true conflict among multiple jurisdictions, then the country that
has the most significant contacts or relationships with issue would apply). In the Microsoft
case, by counting substantial contacts in the facts, federal law could apply given that Ireland
and the EU’s only contact with the case is that the data center is located in Ireland and all
other relevant contacts are located in the United States. See Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law:
Interest Analysis and Its “New Crits”, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 681, 686–89 (1988) (describing
when to use the governmental interest analysis); BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 52–53 (1963); see also Andrew D. Bradt, Resolving Intrastate
Conflicts of Laws: The Example of the Federal Arbitration Act, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 603,
607 (2015).
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policy behind the conflicting laws at issue.148 The next step is to determine
whether the jurisdiction in fact has an interest in the application of its laws.149
Currie based his interest analysis theory on the premise that legislatures create
laws to serve social goals.150 When deciding upon choice-of-law, Currie argued
that the governmental interests of each interested jurisdiction should have
deference in having its law govern a claim or issue.151 Currie’s interest analysis
seeks to provide guidance to the courts to apply the law of a sovereign that would
further its policy goal.152 An interest analysis, applied to the issues raised in the
Microsoft cases, would effectively address whether a false conflict or true
conflict exists between the EU and the United States.153 A “false conflict” exists
where applying only one country’s laws would achieve the policy goals, in
which case the court is to apply that country’s laws.154 A “true conflict” is when
the application of a set of laws furthers each jurisdiction’s policies. In this case,
the court is to apply forum law, find a “middle ground” interpretation of one of
the countries to avoid disruption in comity among the interested nations or, in
the alternative, apply the law of the jurisdiction whose policies would be
comparatively impaired.155
A conflicts analysis of the Microsoft cases centers upon the warrants issued
148 Bradt, supra note 147, at 613; see also Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J., 171, 178 (1959) (describing a basic, yet
comprehensive approach to applying Currie’s interest analysis).
149 Bradt, supra note 147, at 613.
150 Id. at 612; see also CURRIE, supra note147, at 52, 70.
151 Bradt, supra note 147, at 616; Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study
in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 261 (1958).
152 Bradt, supra note 147, at 613–615; Currie, supra note 151, at 261. Currie argued a
jurisdiction’s law represents a policy decision of the legislature. When the laws of multiple
jurisdictions are applicable to a claim, then implicitly each state or country may have an
interest in its law applying to further its policy goals. Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in
Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1589 (1985).
153 See Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Chappell, 407 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2005)
(providing the most significant relationship test to perform a conflicts of law analysis is
where a true conflict exits). The Court held if a case presents a true conflict among multiple
jurisdictions, then the country that has the most significant contacts or relationships with
issue would apply. Id. In the case of Microsoft, by counting substantial contacts in the facts,
federal law could apply given that Ireland and the EU’s only contact with the case is that the
data center is located in Ireland and all other relevant contacts are located in the United
States. Bradt, supra note 147, at 615, 617. For an overview of how to apply Currie’s interest
analysis, see WILLIAM RICHMAN, WILLIAM REYNOLDS, & CHRISTOPHER WHYTOCK,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS OF LAWS 253–54 (4th ed. 2013).
154 Bradt, supra note 147, at 615; see also Currie, supra note 151, at 251–52 (stating
“these are the cases in which application of the law of the place of making advances the
interest of one state without impairing any interest of the other.”).
155 Bradt, supra note 147, at 616; RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 153, at 260–262; Herma
Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts, An Evaluation of
the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 579–80 (1980).
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under Section 2703 of the SCA to a United States based email service
provider.156 Enforcement of the warrant implicates foreign interests narrowly
because Microsoft’s data center is stored in Ireland, a Member State of the EU,
and broadly because of the prevalence of data centers in foreign countries
operated by service providers headquartered in the United States.157 The
interested contacts to consider under the conflicts of law analysis are: (1) the
user whose account information the government is requesting, (2) Microsoft158,
(3) the United States, (4) Ireland, and (5) the European Union.159
The United States has an interest in the enforcement of the warrant served on
Microsoft to allow for law enforcement to efficiently investigate crimes. Given
the prevalence of the use of email communication, the content of emails are a
vital part of law enforcement’s investigations.160 Under these circumstances,
when a crime is committed in violation of federal or state law in the United
States; by convention, the location in which the evidence of the crime is stored
by a third party that is independent of such investigation, does not advance or
achieve societal interest when balanced against user privacy.161 Given the
government’s interest in user privacy and the investigation of cybercrimes, when
Microsoft I, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2016); see Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan
Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament Supporting Appellant at 6, Microsoft
II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985-cv); see also Pablo Valerio, US Firms Looking
to Europe for Data Protection, NETWORK COMPUTING (May 26, 2016),
https://www.networkcomputing.com/cloud-infrastructure/us-firms-looking-europe-dataprotection/129277031 (stating that many large internet companies including Microsoft,
Apple, Facebook, and Google have recently been building large data centers in Europe).
158 See Court Seems Unconvinced Of Microsoft’s Argument To Shield Email Data Stored
Overseas, supra note 137 (providing that Microsoft’s concern in the enforcement of the
warrant is that other foreign countries would not go through the proper federal channels to
obtain data stored in the United States and would start a “global free-for-all.”).
159 Posnak, supra note 147, at 686–89; Microsoft Services Agreement, MICROSOFT (July
15, 2016), https://www.microsoft.com/en-US/servicesagreement/ (“[T]he laws of the state
where [the user] live[s] govern[s] all claims, regardless of conflict of laws principles.”). The
interest of the account holder thus would be implicated when they would have claims or
remedies available to them under applicable state privacy laws depending upon where the
user resides when the privacy violation, if any, occurred. Id.
160 See Brief for the States of Vermont, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae in
support of petitioner at 7–8, Microsoft IV, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (No. 17-2) [hereinafter
Brief for States] (providing that crimes involving the exploitation of children – including
child pornography, luring minor children, kidnapping, etc., – often require law enforcement
to issue probable cause warrants for information stored in emails and instant messaging
communications); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 531, 532 (2005).
161 Brief for States at 7–8, Microsoft IV, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (No. 17-2).
156
157
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there is probable cause and a magistrate judge issues a valid warrant, the
government meets its burden to compel the service provider to disclose the
requested information consistent with the requirements of the SCA.162
Whereas, the EU considers privacy to be a human right; and the EU considers
data protection to be a fundamental right.163 The EU also has a significant
interest in protecting their citizen’s privacy when their citizens have created an
email account with a United States-based service provider.164 Accordingly, the
EU’s privacy regulations subject all personal data stored in its countries to the
most stringent standards to protect the autonomy of the account holder.165 The
EU’s enacted several directives, including the Data Protection Directive166 and
the ePrivacy Directive,167 to further its interest in protecting the privacy of its
citizens and harmonize data security laws across the board to ensure
comprehensive protection internationally.168 These privacy protection laws are
currently provided in Directive (EU) 2016/680, which came into effect on May
5, 2016.169
While the laws regarding privacy protection are specifically enumerated in
the Directive, the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights considers the protection
of personal data and privacy of individuals as a fundamental human right.170 The
EU curated the Charter and the Directive to balance the importance of the need
to protect the integrity and dignity of its citizens with the free flow of data, while
creating exceptions that allow law enforcement to conduct authorized activities
for the purposes of national security and safety of its citizens.171 Collectively,

Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 223 (2d Cir. 2016).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
supporting Appellant at 6–7, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985).
164 Id.; see also Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 461–62, 466–69 (2000).
165 Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
supporting Appellant at 4, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985).
166 Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). This Directive
governs the processing and transfer of personal data stored in the EU and was adopted by
the EU Member States. Id.
167 Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC). This Directive
supplements the Data Protection Directive by providing specific obligations on service
providers to safeguard electronic communications and restrict access of the communications
for purposes of providing the services. Id.
168 Fromholz, supra note 164, at 466, 468, 470.
169 Parliament and Council Directive 2016/59, 2016 O.J. (L119)(EC); The EU originally
enacted this Directive in 2002 and the ePrivacy Directive later supplemented it in 2002.
Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). Parliament and
Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC).
170 Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010
O.J. (C83) 389; Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
171 Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
162
163
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the EU privacy protection laws provide, “personal data can only be gathered
legally under strict conditions, for a legitimate purpose.”172 In enacting its laws,
the EU recognizes that individuals and organizations – both public and private
– transfer data across borders.173 Despite conflicting laws of other countries, the
EU strives to unilaterally protect all data within the jurisdiction of the EU to the
most stringent standards by regulating the transfer of data containing personal
information outside the EU.174
The EU has dedicated a significant amount of its resources to various EU
agencies and officials to oversee and enforce data protection and privacy
concerns of individuals.175 Data Protection Authorities (“DPAs”) in each
member state of the European Union, including Ireland, ensure that each
individual’s privacy rights are in compliance with the applicable privacy laws.176
If an entity violates a citizen’s privacy rights, then he or she may file complaints
with DPAs and cease a data controller’s prohibited actions.177 The European
Data Protection Supervisor (“EDPS”) is a dedicated independent agency that
governs and oversees the processing of personal data to ensure compliance with
the Directive.178 The main roles of the EDPS are to supervise controllers of
supporting Appellant at 7, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985);
Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, Note 8 (EC); see also
Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC); see also Parliament
and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC).
172 Protection of personal data, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/ (last visited May 24, 2018).
173 Id.
174 Id.; see also William Bruce Wray, A European Approach to the United States
Constitutional Privacy, 5 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 51, 61 (2014) (stating European
law outlines a set of rights and principle for the treatment of personal data, whereas U.S. law
does not).
175 For a full list of administrative bodies and data protection authorities in the U.N., see
Data Protection Bodies, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/bodies/index_en.htm. For a general discussion of the statutory foundations of
data protection authorities and their role in the regulation of data protection in the European
Union, see Francoise Gilbert, Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation: The Good, The
Bad, and the Unknown, 15 No. 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 21, 31–32 (2012).
176 FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK,
https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2016/02/fact-sheet-overview-eu-us-privacyshield-framework (last visited May 24, 2018).
177 DEP’T OF COMM., FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD
FRAMEWORK (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/euus_privacy_shield_fact_sheet.pdf; see Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States
and the European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization, 24 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 939, 984 (2006) (explaining while individuals can “receive support and redress,”
penalties “are rarely used because compliance can be achieved through negotiation and
consultation with the DPA.”).
178 Ryan Moshell, And Then There Was One: The Outlook for A Self-Regulatory United
States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L.
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personal data, provide consultation to legislators, and to ensure cooperation with
other data protection authorities.179
There are significant differences between the privacy laws of the EU and the
United States.180 A legal scholar on transnational law summarized the major
differences between privacy protection in the United States and in the EU
regarding data flow between the two countries.181 First, the presumption of
disclosing data by a commercial service provider in the United States is de facto
permitted unless a statute expressly prohibits it.182 Second, the EU prohibits the
disclosure of data to third parties unless the law expressly permits it.183 In the
United States, an individual may waive his or her privacy rights by contract,
such as those in click-wrap agreements when signing up for a user account.184
Contrastingly, the EU does not enforce these agreements against a user and the
EU imposes far greater restrictions on service providers to protect a user from
unknowingly waiving his or her rights away.185 Regardless, it is important to
REV. 357, 369 (2005); see EUROPEAN DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR,
https://edps.europa.eu/about-edps_en (last visited May 24, 2018) (striving to enforce and
reinforce EU data protection and privacy standards, both in practice and law).
179 Moshell, supra note 178, at 369.
180 Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1,
22 (2000) (referring to EU data privacy regulation as centralized as compared to the United
States which is described as “narrowly targeted to specific sectors” and “uncoordinated”);
see also David Lazarus, Europe and U.S. have different approaches to protecting privacy of
personal data, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus20151222-column.html (stating how the European Union begins with the understanding that
privacy is a human right as opposed to how the United States begins with the understanding
of how privacy will affect business); Mark Scott & Natasha Singer, How Europe Protects
Your Online Data Differently Than the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/29/technology/data-privacy-policy-useurope.html?smid=pl-share (explaining how, under the European privacy laws, individuals
can request companies to provide “details about what data it holds” and “what the
information is used for;” however, under the U.S. privacy laws, “[t]here is no single federal
law or standard people can rely on to obtain copies of their records.”).
181 The guidance was provided by Professor Ioanna Tourkochoriti of Harvard University.
Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Snowden Revelations, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership and the Divide Between U.S.-EU in Data Privacy Protection, 36 UALR L. REV.
161, 164 (2014).
182 Id. at 164; see also 5 Leslie T. Thornton & Edward R. McNicholas, SUCCESSFUL
PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 82:47, EU Data Protection Law
(2017) (explaining how the Directive’s adoption of preventing the commercial use of an
individual’s data without consent has had an impact on United States’ businesses).
183 Tourkochoriti, supra note 181, at 164.
184 Jennifer L. Bauer, Playing Off-Key: Trans-Atlantic Data Regulation in A Discordant
World, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 793, 799 (2016); see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 573, 605 (2003) (explaining how adhesion contracts waive privacy
rights but there are issues with consent).
185 Bauer, supra note 184, at 799; see also Guidelines in relation to legal basis for
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note that a data service provider is required to provide notice to a user prior to
disclosure of the user’s information to a third-party if disclosure is not related to
a legitimate purpose.186
Third, the EU provides broader protection to the user than the United States
provides to the user.187 The EU provides very limited instances where a service
provider may disclose personal data.188 When a privacy right conflicts with
another right of an individual, the former is likely to prevail because privacy and
confidentiality are considered fundamental rights.189 However, in the United
States, the Bill of Rights specifically enumerates that other rights will outweigh
privacy concerns in data because they are often considered secondary to those
enumerated in the United States Constitution.190 The Directive defines “Personal
data” as “any information relating to an . . . identifiable natural person [and] an
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.”191 The United States lacks any statutory or concise common law
definition of personal data.192
The EU has an independent agency specifically designed to enforce the
privacy laws in the Directive.193 But the United States does not have even one
federal enforcement agency that oversees privacy regulations.194 Rather, there
are staff members and Inspector-Generals within the various law enforcement
agencies that ensure other agencies are complying with applicable statutes.195
private sector sharing of personal data, DATA PROT. COMM’R (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Commissioner-launches-new-guidance-on-data-sharingin-the-private-sector/530.htm (“Where this consent is sought as a condition for the provision
of the service . . . it is doubtful that it can be considered to be freely given and therefore
should not normally be solely relied upon as a justification for the sharing of personal
data.”).
186 Tourkochoriti, supra note 181, at 164.
187 Id.
188 § 82:47 EU data protection standards—Choosing international transfer compliance
options—Safe harbor, 5 Successful Partnering Between Inside and Outside Counsel § 82:47.
189 Tourkochoriti, supra note 181, at 164.
190 Id.; see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (holding the First Amendment’s
right to freedom of speech will take priority over the Fourth Amendment where the released
information is a matter of public concern).
191 Tourkochoriti, supra note 181, at 168 (quoting Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 Oct.
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 25).
192 See Tourkochoriti, supra note 181, at 168; Bauer, supra note184, at 799 (providing
that personally identifiable information subject to privacy regulations is recognized as two
pieces of information in a database that can directly identify an individual).
193 Bauer, supra note 184, at 799.
194 Opinion 01/2016 on the EU – U.S. Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy Decision, Eur.
Parl. Doc., WP 238 (2016).
195 Id.
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These agencies are not solely dedicated to overseeing compliance with privacy
regulations.196
Article 4 of Directive provides that the law of the Member State where the
data is processed shall apply.197 In this instance, Microsoft’s data center in
Ireland would be governed by Ireland’s laws and enforced by the Data Protection
Act in Ireland. The Data Protection Act of 1988 governs Ireland’s data privacy
laws, and the Data Protection (Amendment) Act of 2003 amended it, (together
the “Data Protection Act”).198 The DPA encompasses the privacy laws in the
Directive, including the obligation of ISPs storing and processing personal data
to comply with these regulations.199 Microsoft’s maintenance and control over
its data centers in Ireland thereby requires it to comply with both the Directive
and Ireland’s statutory law.
Under the circumstances of the Microsoft cases, Ireland’s DPA may conclude
the user of the email account has not consented to the processing of his or her
data.200 The Directive provides consent must be “freely given, specific,
informed and unambiguous.”201 Under the Irish DPA, consent would be deemed

196 Article 29 Working Party in the Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield draft
adequacy decision, at 40, (Apr. 13, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp238_en.pdf. The Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) is responsible for enforcing regulations to protect the privacy of
consumers but the FTC is not solely dedicated to enforcing privacy regulations. Alan
Charles Raul, Frances E. Faircloth & Vivek K. Mohan, United States, in THE PRIVACY,
DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 365 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 4th ed.
2014).
197 Art. 4(1)(a), Directive 95/46/EC.
Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this
Directive to the processing of personal data where: (a) the processing is carried out
in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory
of the Member State; when the same controller is established on the territory of
several Member States, he must take the necessary measures to ensure that each of
these establishments complies with the obligations laid down by the national law
applicable.
Id.
198 Data Protection Acts 2003 (Ir.); Data Protection Acts 1988 (Ir.).
199 Data Protection Acts 2003 (Ir.); Robert Clark, Data Protection in the Republic of
Ireland, 11 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 203, 203 (1997).
200 Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if the data
subject has unambiguously given his consent, Article 7(a), Directive 95/46/EC; see also Lee
Matheson, European Commission Weighs in on Microsoft Ireland Case, IAPP (Dec. 17,
2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/european-commission-weighs-in-on-microsoft-ireland-case/
(providing that disclosure to the United States from Ireland of the requested information
under the warrant issued to Microsoft would qualify as processing under the Directive).
201 Art. 4(11)(a), Directive 95/46/EC; see also Consent as a Legal Basis for Processing
Data, WHITNEY MOORE (Jan. 2018), http://whitneymoore.ie/2018/01/25/consent-legal-basisprocessing-data/.
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unlikely when it is provided as a condition to open an email account with
Microsoft through the click-wrap terms and conditions.202 Microsoft’s Master
Service Agreement, which governs the use of its email services, is silent on
disclosure to third parties.203 It is unlikely that the failure to provide language
regarding disclosure to third parties or the safeguarding of the user’s data would
pass muster under Irish law. Ireland has a sufficient interest in its laws applied
to the transferring of data from the data center in Ireland to the United States
because Microsoft could be found in violation of the Directive for complying
with warrant issued by the United States.204
These distinct differences in privacy protection have historically been a point
of contention between the EU, Ireland, and the United States.205 In 2000, as a
means to alleviate the differences in international privacy policy, the EU and the
United States entered into the now invalidated, Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles.206 The United States Department of Commerce and the EU
negotiated a series of principles to govern data flow from the EU to the United
States to ensure compliance with the stringent privacy regulations in the
Directive.207 If a company regulated either by the United States Department of
Commerce or by the Federal Trade Commission complied with the principles
set forth in the Safe Harbor arrangement, then the presumption was that it
complied with the Directive allowing for companies to transfer data from the
EU to the United States without prior approval.208
202 Expert Report and Affidavit for Respondent at 5, Federal Trade Commission v. The
Western Union Co., 2013 WL 12107385 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[W]here this consent is sought
as a condition for the provision of the service in question rather than on a purely optional
basis, the strong view of the Commissioner is that it is doubtful that it can be considered to
be freely given and therefore should not normally be solely relied upon as a justification for
sharing personal data.”).
203 Master Services Agreement, MICROSOFT (July 15, 2016),
https://www.microsoft.com/en-US/servicesagreement/.
204 See Expert Report and Affidavit for Respondent at 5, Federal Trade Commission v.
The Western Union Co., 2013 WL 12107385 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that in a case
involving the transfer of data from a Western Union processing data in Ireland to the United
States, Western Union could be subject to penalties for violation of the Directive).
205 Federico Fabbrini, Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice
Ruling in the Data Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the
United States, 28 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 90 (2015).
206 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK A GUIDE TO SELFCERTIFICATION 10 (Mar. 2009), https://www.trade.gov/publications/pdfs/safeharborselfcert2009.pdf.
207 Christopher Wolf, Safe Harbors for U.S./eu Personal Data Transfers, Prac. Law.,
April 2001, at 13.
208 Robert R. Schriver, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and Its
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2777, 2780 (2002);
see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK A GUIDE TO SELFCERTIFICATION 11 (Mar. 2009), https://www.trade.gov/publications/pdfs/safeharborselfcert2009.pdf (providing that to obtain the benefits of the Safe Harbor arrangement,
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In 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union invalidated the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles significantly impacting companies that receive data
from the EU in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.209 The case involved
an Austrian citizen who filed a claim with the Irish Data Protection
Commissioner on the grounds that Facebook’s transfer of his data outside the
EU failed to comply with the Directive.210 The Irish High Court referred the case
to the Court of Justice of the European Union, the EU’s highest court, to resolve
the issue of whether it should ban data transfers from the EU to the United
States.211 The Court of Justice of the European Union found that in transferring
personal data from the EU to the United States, the United States, “lacked[ed]
adequate protection of personal data” and nullified the presumption of United
States compliance with the Directive established in the Safe Harbor
Principles.212 The invalidation of the Safe Harbor Principles provided evidence
to the EU that data transfers between the EU and the United States would not be
in compliance with the directives of the Safe Harbor Principles.213
Currently, the United States has Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(“MLATs”) with certain countries, which allows the United States to formally

companies had to abide by principles of the Safe Harbor, including maintaining reasonable
security measure to protect the integrity of the data and providing notice to individuals when
transferring their data to a third party).
209 Christina Lam, Unsafe Harbor: The European Union’s Demand for Heightened Data
Privacy Standards in Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner, 40 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).
210 Id. at 4; Maximilian Schrems, Complaint against Facebook Ireland Ltd – 23
“PRISM”, EUROPE V. FACEBOOK 1, 3 (June 25, 2013), http://www.europe-vfacebook.org/prism/facebook.pdf; see Conor Humphries, Ireland asks Europe’s top court to
rule on EU-U.S. data transfers, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2017, 6:30 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-privacy-facebook/ireland-asks-europes-top-court-torule-on-eu-u-s-data-transfers-idUSKCN1C80XQ (stating that Maximilian Schrems alleges
that Facebook transferred his personal data outside of the EU and failed to comply with the
Directive); see also Thomas Fox-Brewster, ‘Landmark’ Decision Threatens Facebook Use
of European Personal Data, FORBES (Oct. 6, 2015, 4:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/thomasbrewster/2015/10/06/safe-harbour-invalid/#3f6fe42c1d98 (describing the initial
complaint and case filed against Facebook).
211 Humphries, supra note 210.
212 Fox-Brewster, supra note 210; Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot.
Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650; Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No.
117/15, The Court of Justice declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision is
invalid (Oct. 6, 2015); HERMAN T. TAVANI, ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY 167 (Beth Lang
Golub ed., 4th ed. 2013); see also Mark Scott, U.S.-Europe Data Transfer Agreement Is
Ruled Invalid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2015, at B10.
213 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
the Transfer of Personal Data from the EU to the United States of America under Directive
95/46/EC following the Judgment by the Court of Justice in Case C-362/14 (Schrems),
COM, (2015) 566 Final (Nov. 6, 2015).
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request assistance from law enforcement in foreign jurisdictions.214 Currently,
these MLATs provide procedural guidance between the United States and a
foreign nation to obtain data stored abroad in order to respect that foreign
nation’s privacy laws.215 The United States proffers that because warrants issued
under the SCA are not effectively traditional warrants but rather are a warrantsubpoena hybrid, they do not need to go through the process the MLATs
describe to request information stored in that country’s data centers.216 The
rationale is the search is physically performed by the service provider, rather
than a federal agent.217 Microsoft and Ireland advocated for compliance with the
guidelines set forth in the MLATs in Microsoft II.218 The conflict occurs when
Microsoft is directly served with the warrant, rather than the United States
government adhering to the process set forth in the applicable MLAT - because
while Microsoft is complying with a properly issued warrant under the SCA, it
would be in violation of Ireland’s laws and the Directive for turning over the
user’s data.219
The two main issues for the United States with MLATs, including MLATs
with Ireland, are that the process detailed in these MLATs has been described as
inefficient and laborious, and such treaties are only with approximately half of
the countries in the EU.220 The current structure of the MLATs are especially
burdensome on United States law enforcement when an investigation is rapidly
progressing.221 Thus, the United States has an interest in a more expeditious
process than what the MLATs currently afford.222 In cases involving terrorism
and drug trafficking, time is of the essence and compliance with an inefficient,
but integral process would be a threat to the efficacy of the federal government’s
investigation.223
Compliance with warrants issued under the SCA creates a conflict between
the United States and the EU because compliance with these warrants are
inconsistent with the section of the Directive regarding transfer of information

Daskal, supra note 106, at 393.
See P. Sean Morris, “War Crimes” Against Privacy - the Jurisdiction of Data and
International Law, 17 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 30 (2016) (describing the MLATs procedures
generally).
216 Daskal, supra note 106, at 361.
217 Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197, 214 (2d Cir. 2016).
218 Id. at 201.
219 Fabbrini, supra note 205.
220 Daskal, supra note 106, at 393–94.
221 30 No. 9 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 340.
222 Ned Schultheis, Warrants in the Clouds: How Extraterritorial Application of the
Stored Communications Act Threatens the United States’ Cloud Storage Industry, 9 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 661, 691 (2015).
223 Id.
214
215
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to third parties as set forth in the currently existing MLATs.224 The EU and more
specifically, Ireland, as a Member State, have an interest in service providers
operating in its country to comply with the standards set forth in the Directive
and DPA to protect the personal data of its citizens, which equates to an interest
in the United States’ adherence to the MLATs.225 Further, Dara Murphy, the
Prime Minister of Data Protection expressed her disappointment with the United
States’ actions and found the extraterritorial reach “objectionable.”226 In fact, the
Irish government said it would have assisted the United States with its
investigation had it complied with the MLAT currently in effect between the
parties.227 Generally, MLATs include language that a party to the agreement
shall obtain evidence from the other country in accordance with such other
country’s laws.228 Under the MLAT between the United States and Ireland, the
United States must receive approval from an Irish District Court Judge to receive
information stored in a data center in Ireland.229
Based on the apparent distinctions in privacy laws between the EU and the
United States, it is clear that a true conflict exists.230 While the United States
argues companies such as Google and Microsoft benefit from having their
corporations and headquarters based in the United States, the EU retains an
interest in the issues presiding over the Microsoft II case.231 The data centers
where Microsoft stores the information requested in the warrant and are at issue
in the Microsoft cases are in Ireland; therefore, as a service provider, Microsoft
is benefiting from the privacy laws Ireland and the EU affords its citizens.232
Ireland houses many data centers for United States-based companies.233 One
can infer that these companies made the conscious decision to store their data in

224 Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
supporting Appellant at 9, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985); Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Ir.-U.S., art. III, Jan. 18, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13137
(“Requested Party may deny assistance if: (a) the Requested Party is of the opinion that the
request, if granted, would impair its sovereignty, security, or other essential interests, or
would be contrary to important public policy.”).
225 Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
supporting Appellant at 9, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985).
226 Schultheis, supra note 222, at 680.
227 Id. at 680–81.
228 Russell Hsiao, Implications for the Future of Global Data Security and Privacy: The
Territorial Application of the Stored Communications Act and the Microsoft Case, 24 CATH.
U.J.L. & TECH. 215, 240 (2015).
229 Id. at 240–41.
230 Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
supporting Appellant at 7–8, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985).
231 Id. at 8.
232 Id.
233 Schultheis, supra note 222, at 680.

2018]

International Comity and the Non-State Actor, Microsoft

205

Ireland and expect to benefit from the protection of the laws of Ireland.234 For
administrative convenience, it would be easier for courts in the United States to
apply federal law than to apply EU law.235 However, the courts should find a
solution to appease the sovereign most impaired if its law is not applied.236
Therefore, the courts should consider enforcing the MLAT between Ireland and
the US.237
To strengthen international comity in the enforcement of warrants issued
under Section 2703, the United States and the EU should revisit the negotiating
table to procure a workable reciprocal agreement, structuring the transfer of data
between the countries that would appease each country.238 These reciprocal
agreements should include language providing a mutual right on each country
to provide notice to the other country if such request must be denied because it
interferes with the requesting nation’s privacy protections.239 The United States
and foreign governments would mutually benefit from assisting each other in
investigations under these reciprocal agreements because they would provide
balance between protecting the privacy of a foreign nation’s citizens, and
streamline procedures for obtaining information related to serious crimes and

234 Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
supporting Appellant at 7–8, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985).
235 See id. at 10 (stating that EU law is “much more severe than the U.S. standard.”).
236 Under a comparative impairment approach, if an EU citizen was the user subject to
the warrant issued under the SCA, the EU would be comparatively impaired because the
Directive seeks to protect the privacy of its citizens. Engel v. CBS Inc., 981 F.2d 1076, 1081
(9th Cir. 1992); Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European
Parliament supporting Appellant at 11, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 142985); see Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 729 (1978) (holding that
under the comparative interest approach, Louisiana’s law would apply to a tort claim where
the injury occurred because Louisiana had the greater interest in the case because its interest
would be more impaired).
237 Brief of Amicus Curiae Jan Philipp Albrecht, Member of the European Parliament
supporting Appellant at 11, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985); see,
e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (holding that the executive branch
has authority to settle claims with other countries when Congress has acquiesced to the
President’s acts). Here, because the power to enforce the MLAT is given to the President,
the courts are not required to enforce it. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688.
238 Joe Uchill, DOJ pitches agreements to solve international data warrant woes, HILL
(May 24, 2017, 5:11 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/335015-doj-to-sensbilateral-agreements-could-solve-international-data-warrant.
239 See Hearing on Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders: Facilitating
Cooperation and Protecting Rights Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th cong. 6
(2017) (statement of Jennifer Daskal, Associate Professor, American University Washington
College of Law) (describing a reciprocal notice requirement that would allow the United
States and a foreign government notice of a request for data and a fair amount of time to
oppose the request).
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threats to national security.240 Reciprocal agreements,241 as compared to
umbrella agreements,242 which are similar to the current MLATs in place, would
focus on cooperation between foreign governments and the United States.243
Under the current framework, the United States and foreign nations have to
make direct requests to the government for data associated with the respective
country’s law enforcement investigation.244 Therefore, if Ireland requests access
to data stored in the United States, then Ireland’s government must comply with
the regulations of the SCA and obtain a warrant from a federal judge based on
probable cause for an investigation that is local to its nation and the only
connection Ireland has to the United States is that a United States-based
company has information of Ireland’s citizens.245 Likewise, the United States
must comply with Ireland’s criminal procedure laws if it has requested its own
citizen’s data stored in Ireland.246 The process for countries under the current
MLAT framework is administratively inconvenient for each nation and takes an
240 See id. (describing the structure of reciprocal agreements for nations to provide notice
requesting information and for the other nation as a party of the agreement to assist with
disclosure or object the request).
241 See Jennifer Daskal & Andrew Keane Woods, Cross-Border Data Requests: A
Proposed Framework, LAWFARE (Nov. 24, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://lawfareblog.com/crossborder-data-requests-proposed-framework (stating that reciprocal agreements in the data
privacy contexts are defined as a written agreement between two countries allowing for each
nation to directly request data from service providers located in another country consistent
with the privacy laws of each nation).
242 Cf. Valsamis Mitsilegas, Surveillance and Digital Privacy in the Transatlantic “War
on Terror”: The Case for a Global Privacy Regime, 47 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.,
Spring 2016 at 1, 65–67 (providing that the umbrella agreement currently in effect fails to
cover citizens of all EU member states, which in effect would prevent citizens of those EU
citizens whose country is not a party to the umbrella agreement, from seeking judicial
redress for violations of their privacy rights); 5-52 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A
GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA PRIVACY LAW § 52.05 (2017) (comparing the current
umbrella agreement between the United States and the EU, which governs the transatlantic
data transfers between the countries and provides a general framework for data protection,
to reciprocal agreements, which are far more limited with regards to data protection that the
EU wishes to achieve and is inconsistent with current EU Privacy Directive).
243 30 No. 9 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 340; see Nora Ni Loidean, The End of Safe
Harbor: Implications for EU Digital Privacy and Data Protection Law, 19 J. INTERNET L.,
February 2016, at 1, 9 (describing that following Edward Snowden’s leak of the National
Security Agency’s unauthorized surveillance of EU’s computer networks, the Irish Court
stated, “[the exposure revealed] gaping holes in contemporary US data protection.”).
244 See Daskal & Woods, supra note 241 (describing the current process for requesting
data stored in foreign nation may take upwards of 10 months).
245 See Alexander Dugas Battey Jr., A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Case for
Restraining the Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications Act, 42 RUTGERS
COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 262, 270 (2016) (describing the current MLAT process where each
nation may only obtain requested information for its own local investigation in accordance
with the laws of the other nation).
246 Id.
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average of ten months for the requesting party to receive its data.247
However, a reciprocal agreement would allow for a more streamlined process
for the United States and foreign nations to receive cross-border data more
efficiently and expeditiously.248 Instead of the current time-consuming process
in which government officials have to jump through hoops for evidence related
to its own local investigations, each nation would be able to request the data
directly from the other nation’s service provider.249 To avoid a conflict of
interest and to further the interest of each nation’s policies with regard to
personal data, the requested party would evaluate a number of factors to
determine if the incoming request is compliant with that nation’s laws.250 These
factors include, but are not limited to: a showing of probable cause that a crime
has occurred; whether the requesting nation has jurisdiction over the suspect; the
severity of the crime; the over breadth of requested data; and the urgency of the
investigation.251 If the United States is requesting data from an EU nation, then
the United States can show the user is not an EU citizen to assist the EU in
protecting their citizen’s fundamental rights.252 These factors are not exhaustive,
but rather allow the requested nation to determine whether it processes the data
the other nation seeks using a totality of the circumstances while maintaining
international comity.253 These reciprocal agreements would foster cooperation

247 See Brief for Appellee at 52, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985)
(arguing that federal law enforcement agencies prefer to issue a warrant under the SCA
when permissible rather than through the MLAT process because the MLAT process does
not produce immediate disclosure given the procedural and administrative conflicts of the
foreign nation); see also Daskal & Woods, supra note 241.
248 Daskal & Woods, supra note 241.
249 See Matthew McKenna, Up in the Cloud: Finding Common Ground in Providing for
Law Enforcement Access to Data Held by Cloud Computing Service Providers, 49 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1417, 1444 (2016) (describing that reforming the current MLAT framework
could possibly discourage countries from unilaterally obtaining data inconsistent with the
laws of the foreign nation thereby alleviating the concerns expressed by Ireland that the
United States ignored the MLAT in place); Daskal & Woods, supra note 241.
250 Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How Both the EU and the U.S. Are “Stricter”
Than Each Other for the Privacy of Government Requests for Information, 66 EMORY L.J.
617, 624 (2017).
251 Id. at 658; Daskal & Woods, supra note 241. Other considerations for MLAT reform
includes incorporating the privacy laws of each nation into the agreement. The United States
then would incorporate the pertinent provisions of the SCA such as the definition of
“content” and provide a basis for interpretation in the event there is a conflict of laws
between the requesting nation and the disclosing nation. Discussion Paper – What are the
Solutions to the MLAT Problem?, MLAT, https://www.mlat.info/policy-analysisdocs/discussion-paper-what-are-the-solutions-to-the-mlat-problem (last visited May 24,
2018).
252 Peter Swire, Justin D. Hemmings & Suzanne Vergnolle, A Mutual Legal Assistance
Case Study: The United States and France, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 323, 364–55 (2016).
253 See id. (noting that with regards to data transfers across borders, a conflicts of law
analysis requires analyzing factors, including constitutional and procedural issues to
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between the United States and the EU member nations if each nation is able to
expeditiously request their citizen’s data in the other’s territory so long as the
privacy protections, as determined by the citizenship of the user, are not unjustly
infringed.254
D. Congress and Amendments to the Stored Communications Act
1. Amending the SCA
The warrant provisions of the SCA Congress enacted in 1986 are outdated
and should be revised to provide clarity to the courts and service providers.255
Since the enactment of the SCA, technology and the use and storage of stored
communication, such as emails have drastically changed. 256 The EU has also
changed privacy regulations in the Directive over the past few years to maintain
a high level of privacy to its citizens as technology increasingly advances.257 The
United States should follow the EU’s lead given the high acclamations afforded
to EU’s carefully structured privacy regulations.258 Simplifying the language and
structure of the SCA given the advances in technology will afford the SCA the
strength of the Fourth Amendment protection it originally sought to achieve.259
The distinction regarding communication stored for 180 days or more is now
moot.260 The purpose of the “180-rule” was related to property abandonment and
determine which nation has a greater interest in complying with requests from the other
nation’s law enforcement).
254 Negotiated reciprocal agreements could alleviate EU’s concern that the United States
could unilaterally obtain its citizens’ data inconsistent with their data privacy policies. 30
No. 9 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 340; see La Marca, supra note 6, at 991–92 (describing
how in Microsoft II, the United States argues that warrants issued under the SCA act more
like subpoenas which calls into question whether this was the intent of Congress, because if
this is deemed the correct interpretation then it would be a loophole the United States
government may use to avoid the process provided for in the MLATs).
255 Press Release, D.O.J., Acting Assistant Attorney General Elana Tyrangiel Testifies
before the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security,
and Investigations (March 19, 2013).
256 Id.
257 Brief for Appellant at 7–8, Microsoft II, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985).
258 See Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, supra note 250, at 628 (describing the comprehensive
data privacy laws established in the EU to protect their citizen’s fundamental rights).
259 See Allen D. Hankins, Compelling Disclosure of Facebook Content Under the Stored
Communications Act, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 295, 319 (2012) (noting that
revisions should be made to resolve ambiguity regarding messages using social media);
Medina, supra note 9, at 292.
260 Press Release, D.O.J., Acting Assistant Attorney General Elana Tyrangiel Testifies
before the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security,
and Investigations (March 19, 2013).
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if an individual failed to open an email within 180-days, then the individual
abandoned his or her property.261 This provision no longer makes sense if the
purpose of the SCA was to bolster privacy protections for secured
communications.262 An individual should retain their privacy over his or her
emails and text messages so long as these emails are in their possession.263
Congress should remove the 180-day language and revise the statute to
encompass all electronic storage in the service provider’s possession, regardless
of whether the account holder has opened the email.264 This amended language
would provide clarity to the courts and protect information the SCA initially
intended at its conception.265
Currently the SCA only provides a civil right of action for a service provider’s
violation of the SCA.266 If the SCA’s purpose was originally to afford stored
communication Fourth Amendment protection, then the remedies should match
violations of the Fourth Amendment.267 Often the warrants issued under the SCA
are pursuant to a criminal investigation.268 If the stored communication was
obtained in violation of the SCA, then the wrongful actor is not only the service
provider but also law enforcement.269 A proposed remedy for violation of the
Fourth Amendment is suppression of the evidence.270 But under the SCA, the
remedy is not against the government but solely the service provider.271 More
importantly, a proper remedy would not be a civil suit, but rather the suppression
of that information for the SCA to provide the Fourth Amendment protection as
Congress originally intended in its enactment.272
2. Congress Should Pass the LEADS Act
Following the District Court’s holding in the Microsoft I, Congress sought to
Kerr, supra note 21, at 1234.
Id.; Medina, supra note 9, at 292.
263 Kerr, supra note 21, at 1234.
264 In 2011, the Senate considered removing the language providing distinctions in
communication held for more than 180-days by a service provider. Electronic
Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011);
Medina, supra note 9, at 294.
265 Medina, supra note 9, at 292.
266 Kerr, supra note 21, at 1241.
267 Id. at 1212.
268 Reforming the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of Elana Tyrangiel, Principal Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen.).
269 Kerr, supra note 21, at 1242.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1212.
272 Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N. C. J. J. & TECH. 431, 437 (2013).
261
262
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address the outdated language of the SCA through the Law Enforcement Access
to Data Stored Abroad Act (“LEADS Act”).273 Revival of the LEADS Act would
help address issues of interpretation of the Stored Communications Act.274 The
LEADS Act would resolve the two biggest issues the Microsoft cases
presents.275 It would provide the needed clarification regarding the definition of
“warrants” under Section 2703 and limit the users to defendants subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to resolve the European Union’s concerns over
the access of its citizens’ data to United States law enforcement.276 EU Member
states, including Ireland, have expressed their discontent with the United States’
actions.277 After the District Court’s holding in the Microsoft I in favor of the
government, Germany threatened not to use any United States-based data
service provider unless the courts reversed the decision.278
The purpose of the LEADS Act is to alleviate the tension that arose between
the United States and the EU following the District Court’s decision in Microsoft
I case by exempting non-United States citizens subjected to SCA warrants and
limiting the territorial application of the SCA.279 The LEADS Act would prohibit
a warrant from requesting the information of an account holder, who is a foreign
citizen.280 The LEADS Act would limit the jurisdiction of the SCA to users who
are United States citizens or subject to the jurisdiction of the applicable federal
or state court.281
Not only will the LEADS Act address the conflict of law issues among the
EU and its member nations, but it will also seek to improve the inefficiency of
the MLATs which has hindered U.S. federal and state law enforcements’
investigations.282 The LEADS Act proposes to streamline the MLAT process by
273 Patrick Maines, The LEADS Act and cloud computing, HILL (Mar. 20, 2015, 7:00
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/237328-the-leads-act-and-cloudcomputing
274 Battey, supra note 245, at 290–91.
275 Id.
276 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2016); Battey, supra note 245, at 291; see Brian Tuinenga, Log in
to the Danger Zone: Data Privacy Under the SCA and Microsoft, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 291,
316 (2016) (describing the extent of warrants authorized under § 2703(a)).
277 Schultheis, supra note 222, at 664.
278 Id. at 683.
279 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (1986); see Schultheis, supra note 222, at 683.
280 Rick Manning, LEADS Act Stops DOJ Cloud-Based Power Grab, HILL (Feb. 23,
2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/270373-leads-act-stops-doj-cloudbased-power-grab
281 S. 2871, 113th Cong. § 2(4) (2014).
282 Rebecca Eubank, Hazy Jurisdiction: Challenges of Applying the Stored
Communications Act to Information Stored in the Cloud, 7 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L.
161, 182 (2016); Viet D. Dinh & Jeffrey M. Harris, Toward a Modern Statutory Framework
for Law Enforcement Access to Electronic Communications, BANCROFT PLLC (2015),
http://www.bancroftpllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LEADS-Act-White-Paper-for-
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requiring the use of an online portal.283 Through this online portal, other
countries could submit an intake form requesting legal assistance and the federal
government would prioritize other countries that utilize the portal.284 Creating a
more efficient process for requesting information and assistance in each nation’s
respective investigations will facilitate the United States’ inclination to abide by
the MLATs rather than to disrupt international comity by seeking loopholes.285
IV. CONCLUSION
Microsoft II is a case of first impression where the justices will seek resolve
whether the warrant served on Microsoft as a service provider is permissible
under the SCA. Ruling in favor of the United States would not hinder user
privacy under the Fourth Amendment.286 Further, holding in favor of the
Government would not be an impermissible extraterritorial application of the
SCA given the current precedent established in Morrison.287 However, the
Supreme Court will not be able to resolve the ambiguities in the language of the
SCA nor will it effectively resolve the potential detrimental effects on comity
given the interest of affected nations such as Ireland.288 To resolve these
potential issues, Congress should limit the territorial reach of the SCA, negotiate
new reciprocal agreements with the EU, and fix the ambiguities and complex
language in the SCA to bring it up to date with the current cross-border nature
of data.289

publication.pdf.
283 Greg Nojeim, LEADS Act Extends Important Privacy Protections, Raises Concerns,
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 18, 2014), https:// cdt.org/blog/leads-act-extendsimportant-privacy-protections-raises-concerns/.
284 Id.
285 Schultheis, supra note 222, at 690.
286 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Matthew J. Hodge, The Fourth Amendment and
Privacy Issues on the “New” Internet: Facebook.com and Myspace.com, 31 S. ILLINOIS U.
L.J. 95, 100 (2006) (discussing how Facebook and Myspace comply with privacy issues that
arise from law enforcement data requests).
287 Morrison v. Naat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 251 (2010).
288 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European
Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions Concerning Welcoming Foreign Direct Investment while Protecting Essential
Interests, COM (2017) 494 final (Sept. 13, 2017).
289 David Horton, The Stored Communications Act and Digital Assets, 67 VAND. L. REV.
1729, 1730 (2014).
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